And you could simply stop sending out new KDMs to anyone owning compromised hardware without the necessary mitigations installed.
The old idea was that it's good to have certificates expire, as the bad ones will eventually expire and won't get renewed. I think in the modern day and age, where we live from one zero-day exploit to the other, that's pretty much b.s. Bad certificates, those being used to encrypt your internet traffic for example, need to be put on CRLs immediately and can't wait until they expire. Machine certificates should live as long as the machine lives. Once a particular machine gets compromised, that certificate simply needs to be blacklisted.
The old idea was that it's good to have certificates expire, as the bad ones will eventually expire and won't get renewed. I think in the modern day and age, where we live from one zero-day exploit to the other, that's pretty much b.s. Bad certificates, those being used to encrypt your internet traffic for example, need to be put on CRLs immediately and can't wait until they expire. Machine certificates should live as long as the machine lives. Once a particular machine gets compromised, that certificate simply needs to be blacklisted.
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